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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1995, a task force representing employers, employees, and arbitration
service providers drafted A DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL FOR MEDIATION AND
ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY DISPUTES ARISING OUT OF THE EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONSHIP (the "Employment Protocol").' This Protocol set minimum
procedural safeguards for inclusion in all employment arbitration
* Professor of Law, Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky
University. Special thanks to Wendy Bauer, Christopher Drahozal, Dennis Nolan, Arnold
Zack, the participants at the OSJDR 2005 Symposium, and the OSJDR members who
organized and edited an exemplary Symposium. Comments are welcome and should be
directed to balesr@nku.edu.
I See Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes
Arising Out of the Employment Relationship, 9A LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 142, at
534:401 (May 9, 1995) [hereinafter Employment Protocol]. The Employment Protocol is
reproduced at LAURA J. COOPER ET AL., ADR IN THE WORKPLACE 891-95 (2d ed. 2005).
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agreements. For example, participants agreed that employment arbitrators
should be qualified to decide statutory disputes, that employees should have
a right to counsel in arbitration proceedings, and that arbitrators should be
empowered to award the full panoply of damages permitted by law.2
The Employment Protocol has been extremely influential.3 It has been
adopted by the major arbitration service providers, members of which will
refuse to arbitrate cases under rules inconsistent with the Protocol.4 It has
inspired two additional Protocols, both adopted in 1998: the Due Process
Protocol for Consumer Disputes5 (the "Consumer Protocol") and the Health
Care Due Process Protocol 6 (the "Health Care Protocol"). 7 The Employment
Protocol has provided scrupulous employers with a model for drafting fair,
ethical, and enforceable arbitration agreements. 8 It has guided courts in their
decisions of whether to enforce particular employment arbitration
agreements. 9
Nonetheless, the Employment Protocol has been subject to criticism. The
drafters themselves announced that they could not agree whether employers
should be permitted to require employees to sign pre-dispute agreements to
arbitrate statutory employment claims as a condition of employment'-a
critical issue, since the Protocol has become a potent precipitant of these
agreements. 11 Margaret Harding has pointed out that the absence of
monitoring and enforcement provisions may encourage some short-sighted
2 Employment Protocol, supra note 1, §§ B.1, C.5.
3 See generally Margaret M. Harding, The Limits of the Due Process Protocols, 19
OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. REsOL. 369 (2004) (discussing the impact of the Employment
Protocol).
4 See infra Part III.A.
5 Due Process Protocol for Consumer Disputes: A Due Process Protocol for the
Mediation and Arbitration of Consumer Disputes, Program Book (Comm'n on Health
Care Disp. Resol., ABA Section on Disp. Resol., Wash., D.C.), Apr. 30, 1999, at 43
[hereinafter Consumer Protocol].
6 Health Care Due Process Protocol: A Due Process Protocol for Mediation and
Arbitration of Health Care Disputes, Program Book (Comm'n on Health Care Dispute
Resolution, ABA Section on Disp. Resol., Wash., D.C.), Apr. 30, 1999, at 1 [hereinafter
Health Care Protocol].
7 See infra Part III.B.
8 See infra Part III.C; cf Rick Bales & Reagan Burch, The Future of Employment
Arbitration in the Nonunion Sector, 45 LAB. L.J. 627, 634 (1994) (arguing that employers
should "bend over backwards" to draft fair arbitration procedures).
9 See infra Part III.D.
10 Employment Protocol, supra note 1, § A.
11 See Harding, supra note 3, at 451 (noting that the drafters' failure to resolve this
issue "allowed the status quo to continue even in the face of significant opposition to the
use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in employment agreements .... ").
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arbitrators to disregard the Protocol and arbitrate cases under lopsided
arbitral rules.12 Katherine Stone has criticized the Protocol as inadequate and
skewed in favor of employers.13 Leona Green has argued that the Protocol
would have been more employee-friendly had the group of drafters been
more demographically diverse. 14
A final criticism is that the Protocol, drafted ten years ago in the infancy
of employment arbitration, no longer provides the degree of prospective
guidance that it once did. 15 Courts now are faced with issues the Protocol's
drafters never anticipated. While the Protocol was originally intended as a
guidepost for employers rather than the judiciary, 16 it has commendably
functioned in both roles. Permitting the Protocol to fade into obsolescence
would be a considerable loss.
This article urges the drafters of the original Employment Protocol (and
their professional successors) to reconvene to revise and update the Protocol.
The article discusses twenty issues that either the Protocol did not address or
that might profitably be reconsidered in light of subsequent developments. 17
These twenty issues are grouped into six categories: contract-formation
issues, barriers to access, process issues, remedies issues, FAA issues, and
conflicts of interest.
This article focuses on one such issue in particular-the issue of how
employment arbitrators should handle potential conflicts of interest. The
Protocol currently requires only that potential arbitrators "disclose" potential
conflicts; 18 if the parties go forward with the arbitration, they are deemed to
have "consented" to the conflict. Recent social science literature, however,
suggests that this "disclose and consent" approach does not sufficiently
protect unsophisticated parties such as pro se employees, and that the
Protocol's approach may even exacerbate the conflict. 19  Thus, a
disqualification rule may be a more appropriate response to conflicts of
interest.
12 Id. at 421-45. See also Kimberlee K. Kovach, Musings on Idea(l)s in the Ethical
Regulation of Mediators, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 123 (2005) (discussing the need
for mechanisms to enforce ethical standards in mediation).
13 Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment
Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REv. 1017, 1045 (1996).
14 Leona Green, Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Employment Disputes: A Public
Policy Issue in Need of a Legislative Solution, 12 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y
173,215 (1998).
15 Harding, supra note 3, at 452-55.
16 See e-mail from Arnold Zack to author (Apr. 4, 2005) (on file with author).
17 See infra Part IV.
18 Employment Protocol, supra note 1, § C.4.
19 See infra Part IV.
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The Protocol's shortcomings suggest two things. The first is that the
Employment Protocol should be revised and updated to provide guidance on
the issues currently facing the courts, and to anticipate issues likely to arise
in the future. Second, courts should not abdicate their responsibility to ensure
fair arbitral processes by refusing to enforce lopsided arbitration agreements.
II. CREATION
I have elsewhere described the legal background of employment
arbitration, 20 and Margaret Harding has elsewhere described the development
of the Employment Protocol, 21 so I will provide only a short summary of
these topics here.
A. The Legal Background
Common law courts were hostile to executory arbitration agreements.
22
In 1925, Congress responded by enacting the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA),23 which required courts to enforce arbitration agreements related to
commerce and maritime transactions. However, in the 1953 decision of
Wilko v. Swan, 24 the Supreme Court held that an arbitration clause invoked
in connection with a fraud claim brought under the Securities Act of 193325
was void as an invalid waiver of the substantive statutory law. Lower federal
courts subsequently interpreted Wilko as creating a "public policy" defense
to the enforcement of arbitration agreements under the FAA when statutory
claims were at issue.26
20 Richard A. Bales, The Laissez-Faire Arbitration Market and the Need for a
Uniform Federal Standard Governing Employment and Consumer Arbitration, 52 KAN.
L. REV. 583, 588-606 (2004).
21 Harding, supra note 3, at 384-91.
22 See, e.g., Or. & W. Mortgage Sav. Bank v. Am. Mortgage Co., 35 F. 22 (Or.
1888); Jones v. Harris, 59 Miss. 214 (1881), overruled by IP Timberlands Operating Co.
v. Denmiss Corp., 726 So.2d 96, 104 (Miss. 1998); Allen v. Watson, 16 Johns. 205, 208-
10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819); Kill v. Hollister, (1746) 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (K.B.); Vynior's
Case, (1609) 77 Eng. Rep. 595 (K.B.).
23 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000) (originally enacted as The
United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, §§ 1-15, 43 Stat. 883-86 (1925)).
24 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).
25 Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2000).
26 See, e.g., Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827-28
(2d Cir. 1968).
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Contractual labor claims, apparently, were different. 27 Four years after
Wilko, the Supreme Court held that federal courts could enforce arbitration
clauses contained in labor agreements, though the Court relied on Section
301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 ("LMRA"), 28 not the
FAA, for this holding.29 In the 1960 Steelworkers Trilogy, the Court strongly
endorsed the use of arbitration as a mechanism for resolving industrial
disputes arising under labor agreements, again relying on the LMRA.30
In 1964, Congress enacted Title VII, which prohibited employment
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.3 1
Subsequent federal statutes extended protection to age,32 pregnancy,33 and
disability.3 4 State legislatures passed parallel state statutes,3 5 and state courts
began to use contract and tort doctrines to soften the common-law rule of
employment-at-will.3 6 This explosion in employment rights-based on
statutory and common-law rights rather than contractual rights conferred by
labor agreements-was accompanied by a dramatic increase in litigated
employment claims.3 7
Were these new rights arbitrable? The Supreme Court initially seemed to
say no, when it ruled in the 1974 case of Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.3 8
that an employee's arbitration of a just-cause claim under a labor agreement
did not foreclose subsequent litigation of a statutory discrimination claim
27 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578
(1960). See also Martin H. Malin & Jeanne M. Vonhof, The Evolving Role of the Labor
Arbitrator, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 199 (2005) (discussing the judicial
development of labor arbitration).
28 Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2000).
29 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 458 (1957).
30 See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 566-67 (1960);
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); Warrior
& Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582.
31 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
32 Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621-34 (2000).
33 Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000).
34 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (2000).
35 R. Bales, A New Direction for American Labor Law: Individual Autonomy and
the Compulsory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights, 30 HOu. L. REV. 1863,
1876-77 (1994).
36 Id. at 1877-78.
37 See Clyde W. Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the
Guard, 67 NEB. L. REv. 7 (1988) (noting that the principal source of worker protection
was shifting from contractual rights negotiated through collective bargaining agreements
to law-created individual employment rights).
38 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51-53 (1974).
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based on the same facts. In that opinion, the Court denigrated arbitration as a
forum for resolving statutory employment claims, citing the informality of
arbitral procedures, the lack of labor arbitrators' expertise on issues of
substantive law, and the absence of written opinions.3 9 However, in three
subsequent cases collectively known as the Mitsubishi Trilogy,40 the Court
overruled Wilko and enforced arbitration agreements covering antitrust,
securities, and racketeering laws. In doing so, the Court declared that "we are
well past the time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration
and of the competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the development of
arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution. ' '41
The watershed employment arbitration case was the 1991 case of Gilmer
v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,42 in which the Supreme Court held that the
FAA permitted an employer to require a non-union employee to arbitrate
rather than litigate a federal age discrimination claim pursuant to a pre-
dispute arbitration agreement that the employee had been required to sign as
a condition of employment. The Gilmer Court quoted with approval the
statement in Mitsubishi that "[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a
party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only
submits their resolution to an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum."'43 The
Court stated that objections of unconscionability and procedural unfairness
must be addressed on a case-by-case basis, and that employment arbitration
agreements would be enforced absent "the sort of fraud or overwhelming
economic power that would provide grounds 'for the revocation of any
contract. 44
The Gilmer Court's enforcement of the arbitration agreement in that case
signaled that the arbitral procedures available there met at least the minimum
threshold for preserving the "substantive rights afforded by the [employment
discrimination] statute" 45  and for overcoming contract claims of
unconscionability and procedural unfairness. Beyond such a minimum
threshold, however, the Court gave little guidance as to when an employment
arbitration agreement would be sufficiently egregious to merit non-
3 9 Id. at 56-58.
40 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 479, 486
(1989); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238, 242 (1987);
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 640 (1985).
41 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626-27.
42 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
43 Id. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628).
44 Id. at 33 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627).
45 Id. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628).
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enforcement, leaving this to be resolved (often inconsistently) 46 by the lower
courts. The Employment Protocol, at least initially, helped to fill the gap.
B. The Development of the Employment Protocol47
The Employment Protocol had its genesis in the Dunlop Commission,
which was created in 1993 at President Clinton's request to "investigate the
current state of worker-management relations in the United States." 48 In an
initial Fact-Finding Report, the Commission found that litigation was a poor
enforcement mechanism for statutory employment rights, since the high costs
and delay associated with litigation tended to exclude precisely the class of
employees that the discrimination statutes were designed to protect.49 The
Commission cited with approval the labor arbitration process for resolving
grievances arising out of collective bargaining agreements. 50 However, the
Commission recognized that labor arbitration was only procedurally fair to
certain employees because of the presence of the union in both the
negotiation of arbitral agreements and the arbitration process itself; non-
union employees, by contrast, typically were presented with an employer-
drafted agreement on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and were responsible for
finding their own representation for an arbitral hearing. 51 Procedural
protections for non-union employees would have to come from another
source.
John Dunlop, Chair of the Commission, asked Arnold Zack, then
President of the National Academy of Arbitrators, to draft a list of standards
appropriate for arbitration agreements that were drafted by employers for
resolving statutory employment claims. 52 Zack brought the matter to the
attention of the American Bar Association's Council of the Labor and
Employment Law Section. 53 Two members of the Council suggested
creating a committee of representatives from organizations "with a stake in
46 See Bales, supra note 20, at 625-26.
47 This section is little more than a summary of Margaret Harding's thorough
discussion of the subject. See Harding, supra note 3, at 384-401.
48 COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, FACT-
FINDING REPORT xi (May 1994) [hereinafter FACT-FINDING REPORT].
49 Id. at 112-13. For a more recent discussion of this issue, see Lewis L. Maltby,
Employment Arbitration and Workplace Justice, 38 U.S.F. L. REv. 105, 115-17 (2003).
50 FACT-FINDING REPORT, supra note 48, at 122.
51 Seeid. at 115, 118.
52 Arnold M. Zack, The Evolution of the Employment Protocol, DisP. RESOL. J.,
Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 36.
5 3 JOHN T. DUNLOP & ARNOLD M. ZACK, MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF
EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES xviii (1997).
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fair due process." 54 Shortly thereafter, Zack initiated a Task Force on
Alternative Dispute Resolution, composed of representatives from the
American Bar Association, the Society of Professionals in Dispute
Resolution, the National Academy of Arbitrators, the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service, the National Employment Lawyers' Association, the
American Civil Liberties Union, and the International Ladies Garment
Workers' Union.55 This Task Force began its work in September 1994, and
released the Employment Protocol in May 1995.56
C. The Content of the Employment Protocol
The Employment Protocol has four parts. In the first part, the Protocol
expressly declines to take a position on the issue of whether employers
should be permitted to require employees to sign pre-dispute agreements to
arbitrate statutory employment claims as a condition of employment,57 and
instead merely lists the "spectrum" of opinion on the issue. This is a major
weakness of the Protocol, since one purpose of the Protocol was to encourage
employment arbitration, 58 and since the Protocol has in fact accomplished
this result. 59
The second part of the Employment Protocol provides that employees
"have a right to be represented by a spokesperson of their own choosing,"
and encourages employers to pay for at least some of these fees.60 While
recognizing that discovery is more limited in arbitration than in litigation,
this part of the Protocol nonetheless provides that "employees should have
access to all information reasonably relevant to... their claims." 61 It
recommends that, prior to the selection of an arbitrator, each party should be
provided with sufficient information to contact the representative of the
parties in the prospective arbitrator's six most recent cases. 62
The third part of the Employment Protocol describes arbitrator
qualifications, selection, and authority. Arbitrators should have adequate
training,63 "skill in the conduct of hearings, knowledge of the statutory issues
54 Zack, supra note 52, at 36.
55 DUNLOP & ZACK, supra note 53, at xiv.
56 Id. at xiv, 45.
57 Employment Protocol, supra note 1, § A.
58 Id. § "Genesis."
59 See infra Part III.A.
60 Employment Protocol, supra note 1, § B. 1, B.2.
61 Id. § B.3.
62 Id.
63 Id. § C.2.
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at stake in the dispute, and familiarity with the workplace and employment
environment. '64 A roster of arbitrators "should be established on a non-
discriminatory basis, diverse by gender, ethnicity, background, and
experience." 65 Both parties should participate in arbitral selection, or should
delegate that authority to an arbitration service provider.66 The arbitrator
"must be independent of bias toward any party, '67 and must "disclose any
relationship which might reasonably constitute or be perceived as a conflict
of interest."'68 The arbitrator should have the authority to resolve issues
arising in the arbitration, and to award "whatever relief would be available in
court under the law."'69 Cost-sharing is recommended unless one party cannot
afford it, in which case the parties are encouraged to agree to a cost-sharing
arrangement. 70 If the parties are unable to do so, the arbitrator should
determine the allocation of fees. 71
The fourth part of the Employment Protocol provides that the
"arbitrator's award should be final and binding and the scope of review
should be limited. 72
The Employment Protocol was designed to provide access to a dispute
resolution forum to employees who, because of cost and delay, have
effectively been denied access to any meaningful judicial or administrative
forum.7 3 It also was designed to help create a "level playing field" for
employees and employers.74 Consistent with this goal, the Employment
64Id. §C.1.
65 Id.
6 6 Id. § C.3.
6 7 Id. §C.1.
68 Id. § C.4.
6 9 Id. §C.5.
70 Id. § C.6.
71 Id. An empirical study of American Arbitration Association employment
arbitration found that AAA employment arbitrators exercised their discretion to reallocate
arbitrator's fees to the employer in 70.25% of the cases, hearing fees in 71.3% of the
cases, and some or all of the filing fees in 85.12% of the cases. Even when employees
lost on the merits, the arbitrator nonetheless shifted some or all of the employee's share
of these fees to the employer in approximately 65% of the cases. Elizabeth Hill, Due
Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration Under the Auspices
of the American Arbitration Association, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 777, 812
(2003).
72 Employment Protocol, supra note 1, § A.
73 Id. § at Genesis.
741d. (encouraging arbitration that is "fair" and that contains "due process
safeguards"); see also Harding, supra note 3, at 401 (noting that "[e]ach of the provisions
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Protocol instructs arbitrators to "reject cases if they believe the procedure [in
a particular arbitration case] lacks requisite due process. 75
III. IMPACT
The Employment Protocol has been extremely influential in a variety of
ways. First, it has been adopted by the major arbitration service providers.
Second, it has inspired the Consumer Protocol and the Health Care Protocol,
both adopted in 1998. Third, it has provided scrupulous employers with a
model for drafting fair and enforceable arbitration agreements. Fourth, it has
guided courts in their decisions of whether to enforce particular employment
arbitration agreements.
A. Widespread Adoption
Both the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and the Judicial
Arbitration and Mediation Service have endorsed the Employment Protocol,
incorporated the principles of the Protocol into their own arbitration rules,
and have agreed to administer only employment arbitrations that are
conducted consistently with the Protocol. 76 Most other arbitration service
providers have taken similar steps. 77 Many independent arbitrators have
likely done so as well. The adherence of arbitrators and arbitral service
providers to the Protocol helps protect employees from lopsided arbitral
procedures in two ways. First, it encourages employers to draft fair
procedures as a means of ensuring a ready supply of arbitrators (and
therefore a workable non-judicial dispute resolution system). Second, an
arbitrator's or arbitration service provider's refusal to arbitrate under a set of
arbitral rules is powerful evidence in a judicial proceeding to determine
whether an arbitration agreement is enforceable. 78
of the Employment Protocol were designed to help create a level procedural playing field
between the disputants and to give disputants an equal opportunity to be heard.").
75 Employment Protocol, supra note 1, § C. 1.
76 Harding, supra note 3, at 403-04. See also Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173
F.3d 933, 941 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing the testimony of several arbitrators and arbitral
service providers as a basis for the court's finding that the employer-promulgated arbitral
procedures were "warped" and "skewed" in the employers' favor).
77 Harding, supra note 3, at 404 & n.196.
78 See Hooters, 173 F.3d at 941; see also Martinez v. Master Protection Corp., 12
Cal. Rptr. 3d 663, 672 n.5 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that arbitration agreement was
unconscionable, and noting that AAA had refused to arbitrate the case because the
arbitral rules were contrary to the Employment Protocol).
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B. Model for Other Protocols
The Employment Protocol inspired the Consumer Protocol and the
Health Care Protocol. In 1997, AAA convened a National Consumer
Disputes Advisory Committee to "advise the [AAA] in the development of
standards and procedures for the equitable resolution of consumer
disputes." 79 This Advisory Committee drafted the Consumer Protocol, which
was signed in April 199880 and adopted by AAA later that same year.81
The Consumer Protocol contains fifteen guiding principles, many of
which provide consumers with more protection than the Employment
Protocol provided employees. For example, the Consumer Protocol requires
that the ADR program be independent of the parties, 82 a requirement not
found in the Employment Protocol. Similarly, the Consumer Protocol does
more to ensure that signatories have "knowing, informed assent"8 3: it
requires that consumers be given "clear and adequate notice of the arbitration
provision and its consequences" 84 as well as access to information regarding
the arbitration process, including costs. 85 Like the Employment Protocol,
however, the Consumer Protocol does not prohibit predispute arbitration
agreements.
The Health Care Protocol apparently had its genesis when the California
Supreme Court criticized Kaiser Permanente's administration of its
arbitration program. 86 This criticism prompted the creation of the
Commission on Health Care Dispute Resolution, which was comprised of
representatives of AAA, the American Bar Association, and the American
Medical Association.8 7 The Health Care Protocol contains ten guiding
79 Consumer Protocol, supra note 5, Introduction: Genesis of the Advisory
Committee.
80 Id.
81 Thomas J. Stipanowich, Resolving Consumer Disputes, DisP. RESOL. J., Aug.
1998, at 13.
82 Consumer Protocol, supra note 5, at Principle 3: Independent and Impartial
Neutral; Independent Administration.
83 Id. at Principle 11: Agreements to Arbitrate, Reporter's Comments.
84 Id.
85 Id. at Principle 2: Access to Information Regarding ADR Program, Reporter's
Comments.
86 Margaret A. Jacobs, American Arbitration Association to Change Policy on
Health Care, WALL ST. J., July 1, 1998, at B5, cited in Harding, supra note 3, at 407
n.219.
87 Commission on Health Care Dispute Resolution, Final Report (July 27, 1998), at
3-4.
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principles, similar to those of the Employment and Consumer Protocols. 88
Unlike those Protocols, however, the Health Care Protocol bans the use of
predispute arbitration agreements, permitting patients to agree to arbitration
only after a dispute has arisen.89 The Health Care Protocol was signed in
1998,90 endorsed by the ABA in 1999, 91 and adopted by AAA in 2003.92
C. Guidance to Employers
Perhaps the most under-appreciated influence the Employment Protocol
has had has been in providing guidance to scrupulous employers (and their
attorneys) who wish to draft fair and enforceable arbitration agreements. The
law reporters are full of cases in which employees have challenged
arbitration agreements that the employees believed were unfair. This is not,
however, a representative sample of employment arbitration cases, because it
obviously does not reflect cases in which the employee happily arbitrated her
claim and was satisfied with the process and outcome (but nor does it include
cases in which the employee, without the resources to challenge a lopsided
agreement, simply gave up on her claim). 93 Richard Ross, Senior Associate
General Counsel for Anheuser-Busch, has explained that it is in an
employer's self-interest to create a fair arbitration system that employees
trust:
The enforceability of these programs will always be an issue. My
philosophy on that is first, you cannot play games with these programs. If
you try to use an employment ADR program to limit legal exposure or
employee rights or remedies, you are going to get shot down. Second, no
matter how fair and reasonable the program, there will always be some risk
that a particular court will not enforce it.
Besides, the true key to a good employment ADR program is not legal
enforceability. The key to a good program is whether it has sufficient
credibility in the eyes of the employees that they willingly use it. If you can
88 Health Care Protocol, supra note 6.
89 Id. at Principle 3: Knowing and Voluntary Agreement to Use ADR.
90 Health Care Protocol, supra note 6.
91 William K. Slate, ADR and the Health Care Challenge, DisP. RESOL. J., Aug.
1999, at 1.
92 Harding, supra note 3, at 409 n.227.
93 Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 662 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc)
("If we do not know who will prevail on the ultimate cost-splitting question until the end,
we know who has lost from the beginning: those whom the cost-splitting provision
deterred from initiating their claims at all.").
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get your program to that level, you don't have to worry about
enforceability. 9
4
Similarly, Martin Malin has explained that an attorney drafting an
employment arbitration agreement on behalf of an employer may be under an
ethical obligation to draft a fair agreement.9 5
Recent empirical research demonstrates that when employment
arbitration is conducted under fair rules (such as AAA's rules, which follow
the Employment Protocol), employees fare at least as well, and in many
respects better, than they do in litigation.9 6 For several years after its
adoption, the Employment Protocol served as a blueprint--or at least an
adequate starting point-for employers who wished to create a fair
employment arbitration system. But recently, legal issues have arisen in the
courts which were not resolved, or not considered, by the Task Force that
drafted the Employment Protocol. The Employment Protocol cannot function
as an adequate guide to employers if it does not address many of the critical
legal issues that employers must resolve when they draft their arbitration
systems. And, of course, some unenlightened employers continue to
promulgate intentionally lopsided agreements, 97 illustrating a continuing
94 RicHARD Ross, CPR INSTITUTE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, How COMPANIES
MANAGE EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES: A COMPENDIUM OF LEADING CORPORATE
EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMS 55 (2002).
95 Martin H. Malin, Ethical Concerns in Drafting Employment Arbitration
Agreements After Circuit City and Green Tree, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 779, 780 (2003). Martin
Malin describes norms, such as the burden of proof in labor arbitration cases, that labor
arbitrators have internalized (and which they apply consistently) despite the absence of
any source of authority requiring that they do so. Malin & Vonhof, supra note 27.
Professor Malin's BRANDEIS L.J. article argues that attorneys drafting employment
arbitration agreements have an ethical obligation to make such agreements fair, but he
does not address the obligations of other arbitral participants. For example, one could
argue that if an employer asks an attorney to represent the employer in an arbitration
governed by lopsided arbitral rules, the attorney would be under an ethical obligation to
refuse the representation. The employer representative obviously would not be subject to
the ethical rules governing attorneys, but might be under a moral obligation to adopt a
fair agreement, and one would hope that the adoption of fair agreements generally
becomes a customary practice. An attorney-arbitrator should probably be held to an
ethical standard even higher than the attorney-drafter (since the arbitrator's duty of
neutrality obviates any duty to vigorously represent a particular party), but a non-
attorney-arbitrator's ethical duty will derive exclusively from the rules of the arbitration
service provider, of which there will be none if the arbitrator is independent.
96 Maltby, supra note 49, at 114.
97 See, e.g., Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, 317 F.3d 646, 655 (6th Cir. 2003) (en
banc) (employer imposed a one-year cap on back pay, a two-year cap on front pay, and a
$5000 cap on punitive damages in most cases); Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d
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need for judicial supervision of employment arbitration and for an adequate
source of guidance to judges.
D. Guidance to Courts
The Employment, Consumer, and Health Care Protocols have been
widely cited by federal and state courts. For example, in the consumer
arbitration case of Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph,98
Justice Ginsberg, dissenting, noted that the arbitration agreement at issue
there "provide[d] no indication of the rules under which arbitration will
proceed or the costs a consumer is likely to incur in arbitration." 99 Green
Tree, the drafter of the agreement, was a "repeat player" in consumer
arbitration and therefore had "superior information about the cost to
consumers of pursuing arbitration."' 00 Green Tree could have, but did not,
draft fair cost-allocation rules, such as "by specifying... that arbitration
would be governed by" AAA's Consumer Arbitration Rules,101 which had
been modeled on the Consumer Protocol. 102 In a footnote, Justice Ginsberg
listed the Consumer Protocol as an exemplary model "for fair cost and fee
allocation." 10 3 Green Tree's failure to draft such rules made it "hardly clear
that [the consumer] should bear the burden of demonstrating up front the
arbitral forum's inaccessibility, or that [the consumer] should be required to
submit to arbitration without knowing how much it w[ould] cost her." 104
Similarly, in Cole v. Bums International Security Services, 0 5 Chief
Judge Harry Edwards approvingly cited the Employment Protocol both as
support for the court's holding that extra-contractual safeguards were
1165, 1175-77 (9th Cir. 2003) (employer imposed a statute of limitations much shorter
than the limitations period imposed by law, prohibited class actions, and required
employees to pay a "filing fee" directly to the employer as a prerequisite for bringing a
claim); Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 298 F.3d 778, 786 (9th Cir. 2002)
(employer limited depositions of employer representatives, but not depositions of
plaintiff-employees, to "no more than four designated subjects"); Prevot v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 133 F. Supp. 2d 937, 940 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (employer gave arbitration
agreements-written in English-to Spanish-speaking employees, and pressured the
employees to sign the agreements immediately).
98 Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
99 Id. at 94-95.
100 Id. at 96.
101 Id. at 95.
102 Harding, supra note 3, at 412.
103 Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 95 n.2 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
1.04 Id. at 96.
105 Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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necessary to ensure the vindication of statutory employment rights, and as a
source of such procedural safeguards. 10 6 However, the court disagreed with
the Employment Protocol's cost-sharing recommendation, 10 7 and instead
enforced the arbitration agreement at issue only because the court interpreted
it as requiring the employer to pay the arbitrator's entire fee. 108
Courts often cite to an arbitration rule's consistency with the Protocols as
evidence that the rule is fair and enforceable. For example, in Wyatt, V.I.,
Inc. v. Hovensa, L.L.C., 10 9 an employer sought a declaratory judgment
106Id. at 1485 n.16.
107 Id. at 1483 n.ll.
108 Id. at 1485-86. Prior to Cole, the prevailing view of legal commentators
seemed to be that sharing the cost of the arbitrator was an essential term of an
enforceable arbitration agreement, on the theory that arbitrators might be perceived
as biased if they were paid solely by employers. See, e.g., Shalu Tandon Buckley,
Practical Concerns Regarding the Arbitration of Statutory Employment Claims, 11
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 149, 179-80 (1996); Reginald Alleyne, Arbitrators'
Fees: The Dagger in the Heart of Mandatory Arbitration for Statutory
Discrimination Claims, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 38-40 (2003). This was the
approach taken by the Employment Protocol. After Cole, but before Green Tree, the
judicial pendulum seemed to shift; many courts concluded that employee access to
the dispute resolution forum is a more important concern, and that arbitration
agreements that require employees to pay a significant part of the arbitrator's fees
were unenforceable. See, e.g., Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d
1230, 1234-35 (10th Cir. 1999) (refusing to enforce arbitration agreement that
required employee to pay for one-half of the arbitration fees).
Since Green Tree, the pendulum seems to have shifted again, with most courts
evaluating fee-splitting provisions on a case-by-case basis and requiring employees to
prove that they cannot afford the costs of arbitration. See, e.g., Faber v. Menard, Inc., 367
F.3d 1048, 1053-54 (8th Cir. 2004). In Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 608
(3d Cir. 2002), the Third Circuit held that an employee's affidavit demonstrating that she
had negative income and negative assets did not relieve the district court of making a
factual determination of her ability to afford the probable arbitration fees, but in Spinetti
v. Service Corp. International, 324 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2003), the Third Circuit
affirmed the district court's determination of inability to pay. In Morrison v. Circuit City
Stores, 317 F.3d 646, 668-70 (6th Cir. 2003), the Sixth Circuit, en banc, held that courts
should consider the effect of a fee-shifting provision not only on the employee bringing a
claim, but also on other employees for whom high fees might deter bringing a future
claim.
The D.C. Circuit seems to be backing away from the categorical approach it adopted
in Cole. See Brown v. Wheat First Securities, Inc., 257 F.3d 821, 825 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(holding that Cole does not apply to state common law retaliatory discharge claims);
LaPrade v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 246 F.3d 702, 707-08 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (enforcing an
award which taxed $8,376 in fees against successful plaintiff).
109 Wyatt, V.I., Inc. v. Hovensa, No. Civ. 2002/0029, 2002 WL 31599790 (D. V.I.
June 5, 2002).
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prohibiting the Commissioner of the Virgin Islands Department of Labor
from trying to prevent the company from including an arbitration agreement
in its employment contracts. 110 The United States District Court for the
District of the Virgin Islands noted that AAA had examined the arbitration
agreement, had found that it complied with the Employment Protocol and
with AAA's arbitration rules, and had agreed to administer disputes arising
under it.11 The court examined the arbitration agreement and agreed with
AAA's assessment, finding that the agreement was procedurally fair and that
there was "nothing hidden or sneaky about" it. 112
Similarly, in Gipson v. Cross Country Bank, 113 a credit card holder
brought a class action against a bank for violation of the federal Fair Credit
Billing Act. 114 The bank moved to dismiss the class action and to compel
arbitration pursuant to clauses in the credit card agreement requiring
arbitration and prohibiting class actions. 115 The United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama noted that the three arbitration service
providers 116 listed in the credit card agreement all had rules consistent with
the Consumer Protocol providing that the arbitrator would be authorized to
award any relief that would have been available in court. 117 Based on this,
the court concluded that the arbitration and class action clauses would not
prevent the credit card holder from vindicating her statutory rights, 118 and
granted the bank's motions. 119
Just as courts have favorably noted an arbitration rule's consistency with
the Protocols, courts often cite to an arbitration rule's inconsistency with the
Protocols as evidence that the rule is lopsided and unenforceable. For
example, in Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 120 the United States District
Court for the District of South Carolina refused to enforce an arbitration
agreement that varied considerably from the Employment Protocol,
particularly with regard to arbitrator selection procedures. 121 The Fourth
110 Id. at *1.
111 Id. at *4-5.
112 Id. at *5.
113 Gipson v. Cross Country Bank, 294 F. Supp. 2d 1251 (M.D. Ala. 2003).
114 15 U.S.C. § 1666(c) (2000).
115 Gipson, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 1254.
116 Id. at 1254 n.1.
117 Id. at 1260 n.5.
118Id. at 1260.
119 Id. at 1264-65.
120 Hooters of Am. Inc., v. Phillips, 39 F. Supp.2d 582 (D. S.C. 1998), affd, 173
F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999).
121 Id. at 598 n.15, 600-02.
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Circuit affirmed, noting testimony from an AAA official that Hooters'
arbitration rules "so deviated from minimum due process standards that
[AAA] would refuse to arbitrate under those rules."'1 22
Similarly, in Martinez v. Master Protection Corp., 123 the California Court
of Appeals for the Second District refused to enforce an arbitration
agreement that, among other things, imposed a short statute of limitations,
and which AAA had twice rejected as inconsistent with the Employment
Protocol and its own employment arbitration rules. 124 In Pine Ridge Homes,
Inc. v. Stone, 125 the Dallas division of the Texas Court of Appeals refused to
enforce an arbitration agreement that, among other things, required the
consumer to pay the arbitration fees of both parties. 126 AAA had refused to
administer the arbitration because the fee provision was inconsistent with the
Consumer Protocol and its own consumer arbitration rules.] 27
A final case, in which the Employment Protocol is cited but
unfortunately provides the court little guidance, is Parilla v. LAP Worldwide
Services VI, Inc.128 Virgen Parilla sued her former employer, LAP, for
discrimination, breach of contract, and several torts.129 LAP sought to compel
arbitration pursuant to a predispute arbitration agreement. 130 Parilla argued
that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable for six reasons.' 3 ' First,
she argued that a requirement that she present her claim to the employer
within thirty days functioned as an unconscionably short statute of
limitations. 132 The Protocol does not address employer attempts to shorten
the applicable statute of limitations, though the Protocol's requirement that
the arbitrator should be empowered to award any relief permitted by law133
could be interpreted as prohibiting a shortened statute of limitations. The
122 Hooters, 173 F.3d at 939.
123 Martinez v. Master Protection Corp., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 663 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
124 Id. at 667, 672 n.5.
125 Pine Ridge Homes, Inc. v. Stone, 2004 WL 1730170 (Tex. App. 2004). The
court found that the agreement was "so one-sided... as to render it unconscionable." Id.
at *3.
126 Id. at *2.
127 Id. at *3.
128 Parilla v. IAP Worldwide Services VI, Inc., 368 F.3d 269 (3d Cir. 2004).
129 Id. at 273.
130 I.
131 Id. at 274.
132 Id. at 277-78.
133 Employment Protocol, supra note 1, § C.5.
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court, without referring to the Protocol on this issue, held that the shortened
statute of limitations was unconscionable. 134
Second, Parilla argued that a provision requiring each party to pay its
own attorney fees was unconscionable. 135 The Protocol does not directly
address whether such a provision is enforceable, though it "encourages" the
employer to pay for part of an employee's fees, 136 and its requirement that
the arbitrator should be empowered to award any relief permitted by law 137
could be interpreted as requiring that the arbitrator be authorized to award
attorneys fees when the employee brings a claim under a statute with a fee-
shifting provision, such as Title VII. The court, without referring to the
Protocol on this issue, held that the attorney fee provision was
unconscionable because the provision favored the employer as the party with
the greater resources. 138
Third, Parilla argued that the arbitration agreement's confidentiality
provision was unconscionable.139  The Protocol does not address
confidentiality. The court noted that the arbitration agreement's
confidentiality provision was based on AAA rules, and that the AAA rules
were generally consistent with the Protocol. 140 The court therefore held that
the confidentiality provision was not unconscionable.'41
Fourth, Parilla argued that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable
because it required that all claims must be resolved by arbitration and not by
any administrative agency. 142 She argued that this provision impermissibly
interfered with the statutory role of agencies such as the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 143 The Protocol does not address the role
134 Parilla, 368 F.3d at 278.
135 Id. at 278-79.
136 Employment Protocol, supra note 1, § B.2.
13 7 Id. § C.5.
138 Parilla, 368 F.3d at 279.
139 Id. at 279-82.
140 Id. at 280 n.10.
141 Id. at 281.
142 Id. at 282.
143 The Supreme Court addressed a related issue in EEOC v. Waffle House, 534
U.S. 279, 279 (2002). In that case, an employee who had signed a predispute arbitration
agreement filed a charge of disability discrimination with the EEOC against his
employer, Waffle House. Id. The EEOC subsequently sued Waffle House for unlawful
discrimination against the employee. Id. Waffle House moved to stay the suit and compel
arbitration. Id. The district court denied the motion. Id. The court of appeals reversed,
ordering arbitration, but limiting the EEOC's potential remedies to injunctive relief. Id.
The issue before the Court was whether an arbitration agreement between an
employer and the employee barred the EEOC from pursuing victim-specific judicial
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of administrative agencies when an employee has signed an arbitration
agreement. The court, however, noted that the EEOC has no statutory
authority to "resolve" discrimination claims, but only the authority to
investigate and conciliate; 144 and that IAP's arbitration agreement forbade
neither Parilla from filing a claim nor the EEOC from performing its
statutory functions. 145 The court therefore held that this provision did not
render the arbitration agreement unenforceable. 146
Fifth, Parilla argued that the arbitration agreement's exclusion of any
arbitrator residing in the Virgin Islands (where the claim arose) or Puerto
Rico was an attempt to "rig the pool" of arbitrators. 147 The Protocol requires
unbiased arbitrators 148 and provides that the parties must either jointly
choose their arbitrator or delegate this authority to an arbitral service
provider. 149 The court agreed with Parilla that an unbiased pool of arbitrators
is a prerequisite to enforceability, but disagreed with her contention that
LAP's geographical exclusion had the effect of creating a biased pool. 150 The
court did not consider, and apparently Parilla did not argue, that this
provision would have the effect of substantially increasing the costs of
arbitration, and that the increased costs would impede employee access to the
arbitral forum.
Finally, Parilla pointed to the arbitration agreement's provision that if
"[LAP] is successful in the arbitration, the Employee agrees to reimburse
[LAP] for the arbitrator's fees and expenses if so directed by the
arbitrator."' 151 Parilla argued that the high costs of arbitration effectively
would deny her a forum to vindicate her statutory rights. 152 The Protocol
recommends cost sharing, but also recognizes that since employees often
relief-such as backpay, reinstatement, and damages-in an enforcement action. Id. at
282. The Court held that the EEOC was free to seek victim-specific relief. Id. at 295-96.
The Court reasoned that Title VII, which created the EEOC, "makes the EEOC the
master of its own case," and that the statute gave the agency-not the courts-the
authority "to determine whether public resources should be committed to the recovery of
victim-specific relief." Id. at 280.
144 For a discussion of the legislative history behind the Congressional decision to
deny the EEOC adjudicatory authority, see Richard A. Bales, Compulsory Employment
Arbitration and the EEOC, 27 PEPP. L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1999).
145 Parilla, 368 F.3d at 282.
146 Id.
14 7 Id. at 282.
148 Employment Protocol, supra note 1, § C. 1.
14 9 Id. § C.3.
150 Parilla, 368 F.3d at 282-83.
151 Id.
152 Id.
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cannot afford these fees, the arbitrator should be authorized to determine the
allocation of the arbitrator's fees. 153 Thus, LAP's provision was not entirely
inconsistent with the Protocol, insofar as the arbitrator was given the final
authority to assess fees. On the other hand, IAP's provision could be read as
creating a presumption that the arbitrator would direct losing employees to
pay for all the arbitration fees, which would be inconsistent with the
Protocol's concern for employees who are likely to be unable to afford such
fees. The court, without citing to the Protocol, remanded the case to the
district court for a determination of "whether the reasonably anticipatable
fees and expenses of the arbitrator and Parilla's financial circumstances are
such that the prospect of her having to pay them in the event she loses unduly
burdens her right to seek relief.' '1 54
The court ultimately found that the thirty-day notice and the attorney-fee
provisions were unconscionable, and remanded the case to the district court
for a determination of whether these provisions should be severed and
whether the "loser pays arbitration fees" provision rendered the arbitration
agreement unenforceable as applied to Parilla. 155 More important to the point
of this article, however, is the fact that the Protocol did not provide direct
guidance to the court on the fairness (and, derivatively, the enforceability) of
any of the six arbitration provisions that Parilla challenged. This case is far
from unique in this respect. The Protocol provides no guidance at all on
many of the issues over which courts currently are divided. These issues are
discussed below.
IV. TWENTY UNRESOLVED ISSUES
As discussed in the Introduction to this article, the Employment Protocol
has been criticized on many grounds. Such criticisms have included the
failure to take a position on predispute arbitration, the absence of monitoring
and enforcement provisions, an ideological tilt toward employers, and the
absence of demographic diversity among the drafters. 156 Perhaps the most
potent criticism-and one that grows more applicable by the day-is that the
Employment Protocol has largely been left behind by ongoing legal
developments. The Protocol accomplished its purpose of creating a baseline
of minimal procedural protections for employees, but it no longer provides
the kind of prospective guidance that it did a decade ago.
153 Employment Protocol, supra note 1, § C.6.
154 Parilla, 368 F.3d at 284.
155 Id. at 289.
156 See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
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The cases discussed in Part III.D illustrate several of the issues on which
the Protocol provides either no or insufficient guidance. These issues may be
broadly divided into six major categories: contract formation issues, barriers
to access, process issues, remedies issues, FAA issues, and conflicts of
interest.
A. Contract Formation Issues
"Contract formation" issues concern whether the purported arbitration
"agreement" creates an enforceable obligation. These issues turn on
interpretation of state contract law. This is because Section 2 of the FAA
provides that arbitration agreements "shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract." 157 Thus, in Gilmer, the Supreme Court held that
arbitration agreements would be enforced absent "the sort of fraud or
overwhelming economic power that would provide grounds 'for the
revocation of any contract."' 158
The first issue is the notice that an employee should receive before the
employee is held bound by an arbitration agreement. This issue has arisen,
for example, when an employer included the agreement in employees'
paycheck envelopes, 159 when an employer sent the agreement to employees
via a mass e-mail, 160 and when an employer gave arbitration agreements
written in English to Spanish-speaking employees. 161 As discussed in Part
III.B, the Consumer Protocol contains significantly stronger notice
requirements than does the Employment Protocol. 162
157 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
158 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991) (quoting
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985)).
159 Compare Tinder v. Pinkerton Sec., 305 F.3d 728, 736 (7th Cir. 2002) (enforcing
arbitration agreement), with Buckley v. Nabors Drilling USA, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 958,
965 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (refusing to enforce arbitration agreement).
160 Campbell v. Gen. Dynamics Gov't Sys. Corp., 321 F. Supp. 2d 142, 149 (D.
Mass. 2004) (holding that an employer's mass e-mail message to employees advising
them of the establishment of a new arbitration policy for legal claims and describing the
policy only through links was insufficient notice).
161 Prevot v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 133 F. Supp. 2d 937, 939-41 (S.D. Tex. 2001)
(refusing to enforce arbitration agreement); see also Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Lang,
321 F.3d 533, 538-39 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding in a consumer arbitration case, an illiterate
borrower who claimed a lender did not inform him that he was signing an arbitration
agreement created an issue of fact on whether the borrower consented to arbitration).
162 See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
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A second and related issue concerns the opportunity an employee is
given to consider an arbitration agreement before signing it, 163 such as when
an arbitration agreement is buried amidst a mountain of employment-related
forms, 16 4 an employee is given a short amount of time to review a long
arbitration agreement, 165 an employer posts an arbitration agreement on its
website but cannot demonstrate that employees were aware of it,166 or an
arbitration "agreement" refers to arbitration rules to which the employee is
denied access. 167
A third issue is whether an employer may retain the unilateral right to
modify an employment arbitration agreement. 168 A fourth issue is the
enforceability of arbitration agreements that apply to employee claims but
163 A related issue is the effect of opt-out provisions. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores,
Inc. v. Ahmed, 283 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that arbitration agreement
that gave employee the ability to opt out of arbitration was not procedurally
unconscionable).
164 See, e.g., Maye v. Smith Barney Inc., 897 F. Supp. 100, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(enforcing arbitration agreement); Berger v. Cantor Fitzgerald Sec., 942 F. Supp. 963,
967 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (refusing to enforce arbitration agreement); see also Shaffer v. ACS
Gov't Servs., Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 682, 687 (D. Md. 2004) (refusing to enforce
arbitration clause contained on page 56 of a 71-page employee guidebook).
165 Brennan v. Bally Total Fitness, 198 F. Supp. 2d 377, 383 (S.D. N.Y. 2002)
(refusing to enforce arbitration agreement where employer gave employee no more than
fifteen minutes to review a sixteen-page single-spaced agreement).
166 Acher v. Fujitsu Network Commc'ns, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 2d 26, 37 (D. Mass.
2005).
167 See, e.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 936 (4th Cir. 1999)
(refusing to enforce arbitration agreement where the arbitral rules were contained in a
separate document to which employees were not given access until after a dispute had
arisen); cf. Tarulli v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 2d 151, 157-58 (S.D. N.Y.
2004) (concluding arbitration agreement is not unconscionable where agreement stated
that the applicant must request a copy of the arbitration rules if she had not received one,
and employee did not do so).
168 E.g., compare Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 939-40 (4th Cir.
1999) (holding arbitration agreement that gave employer unilateral right to modify
arbitral procedures was unenforceable), and Floss v. Ryan's Family Steakhouses, Inc.,
211 F.3d 306, 315-16 (6th Cir. 2000) (stating ability to choose nature of forum and alter
arbitration without notice or consent renders arbitration agreement unenforceable), and
Dumais v. Am. Golf Corp., 299 F.3d 1216, 1219 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that an
arbitration agreement allowing one party the unfettered right to alter the arbitration
agreement's existence or its scope is illusory), with Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283
F.3d 595, 604 (3d Cir. 2002) (concluding arbitration agreement that gave employer
unilateral right to modify arbitral procedures upon notice to employee was enforceable).
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not to employer claims. 169 A fifth issue, related to issues three and four, is
the type of consideration that an employer must give to an employee in return
for the employee's promise to arbitrate. Many courts, for example, have
found consideration lacking when the employer retains the unilateral right to
modify the agreement or when the arbitration agreement applies only to
employee claims or both. 170 Other courts, however, have held that
consideration exists when the employer merely agrees to be bound by the
arbitral decision,171 or by the employee's continued employment. 172
A sixth issue is the one that the drafters of the Employment Protocol
expressly agreed to disagree on: whether arbitration agreements signed
before a dispute has arisen should be enforceable, or whether enforcement
should be limited to post-dispute arbitration agreements. 173
B. Barriers to Access
Another set of issues concerns requirements that employers impose that
may make it difficult or impossible for employees to pursue their
employment claims. In Gilmer, the Supreme Court held that "[b]y agreeing
to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights
169 Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding
arbitration agreement enforceable where one party had option of litigating in court but
other party was required to arbitrate); Gibson v. Neighborhood Health Clinics, Inc., 121
F.3d 1126, 1130-32 (7th Cir. 1997) (refusing to enforce agreement by which employee,
but not employer, agreed to arbitrate all future claims); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Mantor, 335 F.3d 1101, 1108 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.,
328 F.3d 1165, 1174 (9th Cir. 2003)) (holding even where arbitration clause requires both
parties to arbitrate, because the possibility of the employer initiating an action against the
employee is "so remote," arbitration clauses are unenforceable unless employer can show
the arbitration clause is bilateral); see also Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp. v. Wilder, 47
S.W.3d 335, 344 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that a consumer arbitration agreement was
enforceable despite a clause specifying that it applied only to claims brought by the
consumer against the company, and not vice-versa).
170 Harmon v. Philip Morris, Inc., 697 N.E.2d 270, 272 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997)
(finding no consideration where arbitration agreement required employees to arbitrate
claims against the employer but not vice-versa); cf. Dantz v. Am. Apple Group, LLC, 123
F. App'x 702, 710 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding consideration present where both employer
and employee agreed to arbitrate claims against each other).
171 See, e.g., Batory v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 124 F. App'x 530, 533 (9th Cir.
2005).
172 See, e.g., Tinder v. Pinkerton Sec., 305 F.3d 728, 734-35 (7th Cir. 2002); see
also Oblix, Inc. v. Winiecki, 374 F.3d 488, 491 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that employee's
salary was sufficient consideration for arbitration agreement).
173 See supra notes 10-13 and 109-119 and accompanying text.
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afforded by the statute; it only submits their resolution to an arbitral, rather
than a judicial, forum."'174 An arbitration agreement that restricts an
employee's substantive rights or access to a dispute resolution forum thus is
an unenforceable waiver of the employee's substantive rights. 175
One such barrier-to-access issue-the seventh issue overall-is the
enforceability of arbitration agreements that impose a statute of limitations
(either explicitly or through a notice provision) different from the statute of
limitations imposed by law. 176 An eighth issue is the enforceability of
arbitration agreements that impose filing fees on employees. 177 A ninth issue
is the enforceability of arbitration agreements that attempt to impose on the
employee some or all of the cost of the arbitrator. 178
A tenth issue is the enforceability of arbitration clauses that forbid
employees from bringing claims as an arbitral class action. 179 An eleventh
issue is the enforceability of agreements containing forum selection clauses
in which, for example, a company headquartered in California but with
employees in Hawai'i requires that all arbitrations occur in California. 180
174 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (quoting
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
175 See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51-52 (1974).
176 E.g., compare Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1175 (9th Cir.
2003) (holding arbitration agreement that imposed one-year statute of limitations is
unenforceable), with Great W. Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 230-32 (3d
Cir. 1997) (holding arbitration agreement that imposed one-year statute of limitations is
enforceable).
177 Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1177 (imposing $75 filing fee rendered arbitration agreement
unenforceable); Williams v. Cigna, 197 F.3d 752, 765 (5th Cir. 1999) (enforcing arbitral
award which, among other things, imposed a $3150 "forum fee" on plaintiff).
178 See supra note 108; but cf Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and
Contingent Fee Contracts, draft Feb. 21, 2005 (on file with author) (arguing that courts
should not focus on the finances of individual claimants).
179 E.g., compare Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Mantor, 335 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir.
2003) (holding waiver of class actions renders arbitration clause unenforceable), with
Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496, 503 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding waiver of class
actions does not render arbitration clause unenforceable); see also Jean R. Sternlight, As
Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?,
42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1 (2000).
180 See Domingo v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 70 F. App'x 919, 920 (9th Cir. 2003)
(refusing to enforce arbitration agreement that, among other things, required an employee
in Hawai'i to arbitrate a claim in California); Carter v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc.,
362 F.3d 294, 299-300 (5th Cir. 2004) (enforcing arbitration agreement containing forum
selection clause because employees all lived near the designated forum); Ciago v.
Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 295 F. Supp. 2d 324, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that the
validity and meaning of specific provisions within an arbitration agreement, including a
188
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A twelfth issue is confidentiality, particularly with regard to whether it
hinders the identification of certain employers as repeat offenders of
employment laws. 18' For example, in Zuver v. Airtouch Communications,
Inc., 182 the Washington Supreme Court noted the widespread inclusion of
confidentiality provisions in arbitration agreements, but nonetheless held that
such a provision was substantively unconscionable when included in an
employment arbitration agreement because it hindered employees' ability to
prove a pattern of discrimination or to take advantage of prior arbitral
findings. 183 The court also noted that "keeping past findings secret
undermines an employee's confidence in the fairness and honesty of the
arbitration process and thus, potentially discourages that employee from
pursuing a valid discrimination claim."'184
C. Process Issues
Yet another set of issues concerns arbitral provisions that govern the
process by which arbitration is conducted. As discussed above in Part IV.B,
the Gilmer Court held that arbitration agreements are enforceable because
they represent only a change in forum and are not a prospective waiver of
statutory rights. Substantive rights, however, depend for their enforcement
upon the existence of at least minimal procedures. At a minimum, then,
"statutory rights include both a substantive protection and access to a neutral
forum in which to enforce those protections."'185 A procedurally lopsided
arbitration agreement that effectively waives an employee's ability to enforce
an underlying statutory antidiscrimination law therefore would effectively
forum selection clause that would require a New York employee to arbitrate in
California, is a matter for the arbitrator to decide).
181 See David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee
and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33,
63-64 (arguing that enforcement of antidiscrimination laws through the courts is critical
for deterring employer violations and exposing systemic patterns of discrimination);
Clyde W. Summers, Mandatory Arbitration: Privatizing Public Rights, Compelling the
Unwilling to Arbitrate, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 685, 704 (2004) (explaining arbitration
"[limits] consumer's [sic] and other's [sic] ability to know whether they are patronizing a
lawbreaker").
182 Zuver v. Airtouch Commc'ns, Inc., 103 P.3d 753 (2004). Thanks to Dennis
Nolan for calling my attention to this case.
183 Id. at 765.
184 Id.
185 Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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waive the employee's substantive rights, contrary to the Supreme Court's
prescription in Gilmer. 186
One such process issue-the thirteenth issue overall-is whether
additional safeguards are required to ensure that employees (who, unlike
employers, are not repeat players in arbitration) 187 can meaningfully
participate in the selection of arbitrators.188
A fourteenth issue is the availability of discovery. The Protocol's
requirement of "[a]dequate but limited" discovery is a good starting point,
but provides little guidance on where arbitrators and courts should draw the
line between balancing employees' need for information to develop their
cases against the laudable goal of preventing arbitral discovery from
morphing into the expensive and time-consuming discovery permitted by the
federal and state rules of civil procedure. So far, most courts seem to have
resolved the issue by enforcing arbitration clauses that give the arbitrator
discretion to permit or limit discovery, but refusing to enforce clauses that
impose absolute limitations on discovery (e.g., each party is limited to one,
186 See id.
187 Unlike labor arbitration, where both the employer and the union are repeat
players, in employment arbitration, only the employer is a repeat player. As discussed
above in Part II.B, this was one of the factors that led to the Dunlop Commission's
hesitancy to endorse labor arbitration as a model for non-union employment dispute
resolution, and to initiate the process that resulted in the creation of the Employment
Protocol. Asymmetrical repeat-player status results in two systemic employer advantages.
The first is that the employer is more familiar with the pool of potential arbitrators and
therefore is in a better position than an employee to select an arbitrator favorable to its
side. The second is that an arbitrator interested in generating future business will be
predisposed to favor the employer. See Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive
Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration
Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REv. 223 (1998); Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration:
The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 189 (1997). But see Lisa B.
Bingham & Shimon Sarraf, Employment Arbitration Before and After the Due Process
Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out of
Employment: Preliminary Evidence That Self-Regulation Makes a Difference, in
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE EMPLOYMENT ARENA: PROCEEDINGS OF NEW
YORK UNIVERsrrY's 53D ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 303, 324 (Samuel Estreicher
& David Sheruyn eds., 2004) (finding no statistically significant evidence that employers
confronting the same arbitrator in a second case have a higher probability of success).
188 See, e.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938-39 (4th Cir. 1999)
(finding that the arbitrator-selection process was biased because, among other things, the
employer unilaterally controlled the pool of arbitrators); Parilla v. IAP Worldwide Servs.
VI, Inc., 368 F.3d 269, 283 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding that a geographical exclusion of
arbitrators did not create a biased arbitrator-selection process).
190
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eight-hour deposition) or that forbid discovery altogether.' 89 This approach,
however, provides no guidance to arbitrators as to how they should strike the
discovery balance, and provides little guidance to a court faced with a
scenario in which an arbitrator's refusal to permit discovery appears to have
denied an employee the ability to vindicate a statutory right.
D. Remedies Issues
Another set of issues concerns remedies. Employer attempts to restrict
employee access to statutory remedies arguably run afoul of Gilmer's
prescription that arbitration is a change of forum only, and not a prospective
waiver of substantive rights.
One such remedies issue-and the fifteenth issue overall-is the
enforceability of contractual limitations on the arbitrator's authority to award
relief, especially when these contractual limitations are inconsistent with the
relief permitted by statute. Courts have taken at least five different
approaches to this issue. 190 A sixteenth issue is the enforceability of arbitral
attorney-fee provisions, especially as they relate to fee-shifting statutes. 191
189 A pair of 2003 cases decided by Federal District Judge Traugher, of the Middle
District of Tennessee, illustrates this approach. In Wilks v. Pep Boys, 241 F. Supp. 2d
860, 864-65 (M.D. Tenn. 2003), Judge Traugher enforced an arbitration agreement that
presumptively limited each party to the deposition of one witness and one expert, but
permitted the arbitrator to order additional depositions upon a showing of "substantial
need." In Walker v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 916, 925 (M.D.
Tenn. 2003), however, Judge Traugher refused to enforce an arbitration agreement that
limited each party to one deposition and permitted the arbitrator to order additional
depositions only "in extraordinary fact situations and for good cause shown." See also
Williams v. Katten, Muchin & Zavis, No. 92C5654, 1996 WL 717447, at *4 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 9, 1996) (enforcing arbitration award in favor of employer despite employee's
argument that the arbitrator only permitted her to depose one of the four witnesses she
wished to depose; the court noted that the arbitrator had considered but rejected the
employee's request to depose the remaining three witnesses). But cf. Continental Airlines,
Inc. v. Mason, 87 F.3d 1318 (table), 12 IER Cas. 160, 1996 WL 341758 at *2 (9th Cir.
June 19, 1996) (enforcing, over objections of unconscionability, an arbitration clause that
did not provide for any discovery by the employee; "[t]here is nothing that shocks the
conscience about an arbitration procedure that does not provide for discovery ... ").
190 The first is to sever the claim for relief which the arbitrator is not permitted to
resolve, require the parties to submit the remaining claims to arbitration, and stay the
non-arbitrated claim for resolution by the court after an arbitration award has been made.
See, e.g., DiCrisci v. Lyndon Guar. Bank of N.Y., 807 F. Supp. 947, 953-54 (W.D.N.Y.
1992). The second is to strike the arbitration clause altogether and allow the entire claim
to be litigated. See, e.g., Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1062
(11 th Cir. 1998); Alexander v. Anthony Int'l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 267 (3d Cir. 2003)
(striking arbitration agreement which, among other things, limited employees' relief to
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E. FAA Issues
Another set of issues concerns the interpretation of the FAA. These
issues are the proper province of the courts, and probably would not be
appropriate subjects of a revised Employment Protocol.
One such issue of FAA interpretation-and the seventeenth issue
overall-is whether the EEOC may pursue a claim that an employee already
has brought to arbitration. 192 An eighteenth issue is the breadth of the FAA's
exclusion of "transportation workers."' 193
reinstatement and "net pecuniary damages"). The third is to strike the limitation-of-
remedies clause and to give the arbitrator the authority to award damages to the full
extent permitted by law. See, e.g., Hadnot v. Bay, Ltd., 344 F.3d 474, 478 & n.14 (5th
Cir. 2003). The fourth is to let the arbitrator decide whether to award the relief. See, e.g.,
Great W. Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 232 (3d Cir. 1997); Gannon v.
Circuit City Stores, Inc., 262 F.3d 677, 681 n.6 (8th Cir. 2001). The final route is to
enforce the agreement as written. See, e.g., Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28
F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 1994).
191 In Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412,422 (1978), the Supreme
Court held that a prevailing employer in a Title VII case may only be awarded attorney
fees where the employee's lawsuit was "frivolous"; allowing the routine award of
attorney fees to prevailing employers would undermine Title VII by deterring employees
from bringing claims. This leaves open, however, issues such as whether and under what
circumstances arbitrators should award attorney fees, the enforceability of arbitral
provisions in which an employee waives the right to recover attorney fees, and whether
courts should confirm arbitral awards that either deny attorney fees to a prevailing
claimant or that award attorney fees to a losing claimant. See Perez v. Globe Airport Sec.
Servs., Inc., 253 F.3d 1280, 1287 (11th Cir. 2001), vacated, 294 F.3d 1275 (1lth Cir.
2002) (denying enforcement of arbitration agreement that contained clause requiring fee-
splitting between the parties; clause impermissibly limited the employee's remedies
contrary to the Title VII provision that provides fee-shifting to prevailing plaintiffs);
George Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577, 584-85 (7th Cir. 2001) (an
arbitrator's refusal to award attorney fees to the prevailing party as authorized by state
law cannot be vacated or modified for "manifest disregard" of the law); see also Musnick
v. King Motor Co., 325 F.3d 1255, 1260-61 (1 1th Cir. 2003) (enforcing a "loser pays"
provision in an arbitration agreement); Manuel v. Honda R & D Ams., Inc., 175 F. Supp.
2d 987, 994-95 (S.D. Ohio 2001) (same).
192 For a case presenting an analogous issue, see Senich v. American-Republican,
Inc., 215 F.R.D. 40, 44-45 (D. Conn. 2003) (permitting EEOC to seek victim-specific
relief for employees who had signed a waiver and release as a condition of receiving
benefits under an employer severance program).
193 See, e.g., Hill v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 398 F.3d 1286, 1289-90 (1 1th Cir. 2005)
(finding employee was not exempt even though his job duties as an account manager
involved making out-of-state deliveries of goods in his employer's truck); Palcko v.
Airborne Express, Inc., 372 F.3d 588, 593-94 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding employee was
exempt because, as a field services supervisor at a package transportation and delivery
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A nineteenth issue is whether a union may agree to the arbitration of
statutory claims on behalf of its members. In Wright v. Universal Maritime
Service Corp., 194 the Supreme Court dodged the issue 195 by holding that any
such agreement must be "clear and unmistakable,"' 196 and the Court has not
conclusively resolved the issue.197
F. Conflicts of Interest
The twentieth issue concerns arbitral conflicts-of-interest. The
Employment Protocol currently permits an arbitrator to cure conflicts by
disclosing them to the parties. 198 Some commentators have argued that this
"disclose and consent" approach does not sufficiently protect weaker parties
such as employees and that at least some arbitral conflicts-of-interest should
be non-waivable and non-consentable.199
company, he supervised truck drivers); Lenz v. Yellow Transp. Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d 903,
907-08 (S.D. Iowa 2005) (employee was exempt because, as a customer service
representative, he was responsible for coordinating the movement of goods); Lorntzen v.
Swift Transp., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1097 (D. Kan. 2004) (employee was not
exempt even though as a safety compliance assistant, she was responsible for maintaining
paperwork associated with delivery of goods by truck).
194 Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998).
195 Dennis R. Nolan, Employment Arbitration After Circuit City, 41 BRANDEIS L. J.
853, 862-63 (2003).
196 Wright, 525 U.S. at 80 (quoting Metro. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708
(1983)).
197 See Safrit v. Cone Mills Corp., 248 F.3d 306, 308 (4th Cir. 2001) (interpreting a
labor arbitration clause as constituting a clear and unmistakable waiver of the employee's
right to sue under Title VII for sex discrimination); cf. E. Associated Coal Corp. v.
Massey, 373 F.3d 530, 537 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that a collective bargaining
agreement that required arbitration of claims arising under the federal Americans with
Disabilities Act did not clearly and unmistakably require arbitration of claims arising
under a parallel state statute). See also Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Northwest Airlines,
Inc., 211 F.3d 1312 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (per curiam en banc), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 565
(2000), reinstating 199 F.3d 477, 484-86 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (in a case arising under the
Railway Labor Act, a union may not lawfully agree to binding arbitration of employees'
discrimination claims, and such an arbitration clause therefore is not a mandatory subject
of bargaining); Theodore J. St. Antoine, Gilmer in the Collective Bargaining Context, 16
OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 491, 501-10 (2001) (arguing that unions should be free to
make arbitration the exclusive forum for vindicating statutory rights).
198 Employment Protocol, supra note 1, § C.4.
199 See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics Issues in Arbitration and Related
Dispute Resolution Processes: What's Happening and What's Not, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV.
949, 960-61 (2002); Harding, supra note 3, at 454.
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Recent empirical research in the social sciences supports this approach,
and indicates not only that conflicts-of-interest cannot be cured by disclosure,
but that disclosure may exacerbate the problem. Professors Daylian Cain,
George Loewenstein, and Don Moore recently conducted an experiment in
which they paid Carnegie Mellon undergraduates to guess at the value of
coins in a jar.200 "Estimators" received only a short, distant glimpse at the
jar; "Advisors" had much more time to examine and evaluate the jar's
contents. 201 Advisors then gave written estimates to the Estimators. 202
When the study authors paid both sets of students based on the accuracy
of the Estimators' guesses (i.e., both parties had an interest in accurate
guesses), Estimators tended to follow the advice of the Advisors.20 3 Then,
however, the study authors began to pay Advisors according to how high the
Estimators' guesses were; Estimators continued to be paid according to the
accuracy of their own guesses. 20 4 The Advisors, not surprisingly, provided
higher estimates, and the Estimators, unaware of the conflict-of-interest,
guessed higher and less accurately than they had before. 20 5
Finally, the study authors disclosed the conflict-of-interest to both
sides. 206 Advisors raised their estimates significantly higher.20 7 Estimators,
aware of the conflict, discounted the Advisors' estimates, but not enough to
offset the amount by which the Estimators had raised their estimates. 20 8 In
other words, the disclosure of the conflict-of-interest made the Estimators'
guesses less accurate and more favorable to the Advisors. 20 9
The study authors proffer several explanations for their findings. For
example, the psychological difficulty of unlearning or ignoring information,
even information that one knows is inaccurate, is likely to cause an advice-
receiver to insufficiently discount the biased advice of an advice-giver 210
(e.g., Estimators insufficiently discounted the advice of the Advisors).
Disclosure also can affect the advice-giver, in two ways. First, a strategic
advice-giver may provide advice that is even more biased to counteract the
200 Daylian M. Cain et al, The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of Disclosing
Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2005).
201 Id. at 9-10.
202 Id. at 9.
203 Id. at 10.
204 Id.
205 Id. 13-14
206 Id. at 10.
207 Id. at 13.
208 Id. at 17.
209 Id.
210 Id. at 6.
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diminished weight the advice-giver expects the advice-receiver to place on
the advice2 11 (e.g., Advisors' estimates were significantly higher when they
knew the conflict would be disclosed). Second, the disclosure of a conflict
may reduce an advice-giver's (perhaps unconscious) feelings of guilt about
giving biased advice, and thus give the advice-giver a perceived "moral
license" to bias her advice even further212 (e.g., Advisors with a conflict-of-
interest actually believed that the coin jars were worth more than they did
when there was no conflict).213
Parties in employment arbitration do not receive "advice" from an
arbitrator in the same way that an Advisor provided an estimate of the value
of the coins to the Estimator.214 An arbitrator provides an award, not advice.
But an arbitrator may be subjected to the same financial incentives as the
Advisor in the conflict-laden parts of the study, such as when the bulk of an
arbitrator's business comes from a few employers. Moreover, if bias does
color award, the effects are more permanent, because the arbitrator's award is
final and virtually unappealable. 215
In many arbitral contexts, such as labor and commercial arbitration, run-
of-the-mill conflicts-of-interest probably are not significant problems. The
parties likely are sufficiently sophisticated to discover major conflicts (such
as if a potential arbitrator was on the payroll of an industry group) on their
own, and to weigh the significance of minor conflicts (such as giving a paid
lecture at a union convention) accurately.216 Employment and consumer
arbitration, especially when the claimant is pro se, is different, however,
211 Id. at 6-7.
212 Id. at 7.
213 Id. at 14.
214 An evaluative mediator, however, presents a much closer analogy. The
Employment Protocol applies to employment mediation as well as arbitration. See
Employment Protocol, supra note 1, at 534: 403 (stating "[t]he following protocol is
offered ... as a means of providing due process in the resolution by mediation and
binding arbitration of employment disputes .... ").
215 The FAA permits a reviewing court to vacate an arbitration award in limited
circumstances, such as "[w]here there [existed] evident partiality or corruption by the
arbitrators." 9 U.S.C. § 10(2). However, the scope of review is "extraordinarily narrow,"
Forsythe Int'l, S.A. v. Gibbs Oil Co., 915 F.2d 1017, 1020 (5th Cir. 1990), (quoting
Antwine v. Prudential Bache Secs., Inc., 899 F.2d 410, 413 (5th Cir. 1990)), making it
very difficult to overturn an award on this basis. See Stephen L. Hayford, Law in
Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards, 30 GA. L.
REv. 731,745-49 (1996).
216 I am indebted to Dennis Nolan for these examples.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
because "unsophisticated [parties] are exactly the ones who are most likely to
need protection from exploitation. '21 7
Another potential check on arbitral conflicts is the existence of
professional norms. One would hope, for example, that a professional
arbitrator would not let a conflict (disclosed or undisclosed) color his award,
in the same way that one would hope that a doctor would not let her paid
relationship with a drug company affect the advice she gives her patients.
However, the social science literature demonstrates that even if a
professional is willing to put self-interest aside, she may not be able to do
so.218 Studies of professionals, such as medical doctors, show that bias much
more frequently results from unintentional and unconscious motives than it
does from a corrupt and conscious desire for self-enrichment. 219 Thus, an
arbitrator who is earnestly trying to be fair may nonetheless deliver an award
tinged with bias, while honestly believing that his award is completely fair
and impartial.
A final potential check on arbitral conflicts is the ability of the parties to
reject a potential arbitrator who admits a possible conflict-an option not
available to the Estimators in the study described above. However, if most
bias is unintentional and unconscious, this is likely to compromise the ability
of potential arbitrators to recognize and disclose possible conflicts.
This recent social science literature suggests that the Protocol's "disclose
and consent" approach 220 to arbitral conflicts-of-interest does not sufficiently
protect employees, and may even be exacerbating the underlying problems
caused by the conflicts. This lends considerable support to the argument that
at least some arbitral conflicts-of-interest should be non-waivable and non-
consentable. 221
V. EVOLUTION
The Employment Protocol has been extremely influential. It has been
adopted by the major arbitration service providers, it has provided scrupulous
employers with a model for drafting balanced arbitration agreements, it has
217 Cain et al., supra note 200, at 20.
218 See id. at 5-6.
219 Jason Dana & George Loewenstein, A Social Science Perspective on Gifts to
Physicians from Industry, 290 JAMA 252, 252-54 (2003); Don A. Moore & George
Loewenstein, Self-Interest, Automaticity, and the Psychology of Conflict of Interest, 17
SOC. JUST. REs. 189, 189-199 (2004).
220 Employment Protocol, supra note 1, § C.4.
221 Where to draw this line is beyond the scope of this article. For a discussion of
this issue, see Menkel-Meadow, supra note 199, at 960-61.
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guided courts in their decisions of whether to enforce particular employment
arbitration agreements, and it has inspired the creation of both the Consumer
and the Health Care Protocols.
Nonetheless, the Employment Protocol has several shortcomings.
Perhaps the most significant shortcoming is that it is quickly becoming
outdated. The Protocol was drafted in the early years of employment
arbitration, before the drafters could anticipate many of the issues now facing
the courts. I have identified twenty such issues; there almost certainly are
others that I have missed, and there will be still more by the time this article
goes to press.
This suggests two things. First, the Employment Protocol should be
revised and updated to provide guidance on the issues currently facing the
courts and to anticipate issues likely to arise in the future. Second, as some
unscrupulous employers continue to find new and inventive ways to tilt the
arbitral playing field in their favor, courts should uphold their responsibility
to ensure fair arbitral processes by refusing to enforce lopsided arbitration
agreements.
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